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SUMMARY
During the 1980’s, the Dominican Republic made attempts at macroeconomic reform that saw 
little success. A decade later a stabilization and structural reform package was implemented. This 
package included, among other aspects, inflation control through monetary restraint and a tax and 
tariff reform which sought to increase the efficiency of the prevailing tax structure and eliminate 
its relative price distortion while maintaining fiscal equilibrium. Price stabilization was achieved, 
nominal import tariff rates were reduced and the economy started on a growth trajectory that has 
lasted into the present.
The tariff and tax reforms saw light in September 1990 and June 1992, respectively. The 
tariff reform sought to simplify the existing tariff structure and reduce the tariff dispersion as well 
as the average effective rate of protection. Accordingly, the tariff interval was initially reduced 
from 0%-200% to 5%-35% and then to 0%-35%. The tariff rates which were seven in number at 
the beginning of the reform increased to nine by 1997. The average tariff rate was estimated at 
17.3% in 1997.
The tariff reform was also accompanied by the elimination of most import prohibitions, 
licenses and exemptions increasing thus the import tax base as well as the virtual elimination of 
export taxes. The elimination of export taxes coupled with the recent reforms regarding the oil 
tax differential have shielded the performance of budget accounts from commodity price 
volatility.
Nonetheless an implicit export tax to traditional exporters exists as these have to surrender 
their foreign exchange earnings to the Central Bank. The quasi-fiscal revenue potential o f this 
implicit tax depends on the difference between the official exchange rate and the market 
exchange rate.
Still, external sources of revenue are important as they represent 36% of total fiscal 
revenues and 6% of GDP as o f 1998. Import taxes represented during 1995-1998 more than a 
quarter o f total fiscal revenues and 4% of GDP. This dependence on trade taxes, which is one of 
the highest in Latin America and selected Caribbean countries, has become a source of concern 
as the Dominican Republic is opening up to external competition (the country is part o f several 
regional agreements and since March 1995 is a member o f the W orld Trade Organization (WTO). 
In 1998, it signed free trade agreements with the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the 
Central American Common M arket (CACM). In short, how can the country carry out an outward 
looking economic policy while maintaining the present weight o f trade taxes in fiscal revenue?
In 1998, a tariff reform was elaborated seeking to reduce the tariff interval from the 
present 0%-35% to 0%-15%, diminishing effective rates o f protection and the average mean tariff 
rate. W hile the proposal is still under inspection by the legislative power, if  implemented it could 
decrease trade taxes substantially and endanger fiscal stability, especially since the present fiscal 
account surplus falls short o f the sustainability surplus boundary line by 1.5% of GDP.
2A reduction in internal interest rates could diminish the sustainability surplus boundary 
line. Additionally, the fiscal reform — also in the legislative chamber—  which seeks to increase 
the value added tax rate from 8% to 12% coupled with substantial decrease in government 
subsidies (which the privatization law [1997] ultimately seeks to achieve) to state owned firms 
could generate earnings to compensate the fiscal gap and provide the necessary maneuver margin 
to distribute income. First approximation calculations indicated that even if  the tariff proposal is 
carried out and all government subsidies to state owned firms were eliminated, the resulting 
surplus would, other things being equal, fall short of the sustainability surplus by 1% of GDP.
3During the 1980’s, the Dominican Republic 1 made attempts at macroeconomic reform that saw 
little success. A decade later a stabilization and structural reform package was implemented. This 
package included, among other aspects, inflation control through monetary restraint and a tax and 
tariff reform which sought to increase the efficiency of the prevailing tax structure and eliminate 
its relative price distortion while maintaining fiscal equilibrium. Price stabilization was achieved, 
nominal import tariff rates were reduced and the economy started on a growth trajectory that has 
lasted into the present.
However, fiscal performance remained dependent on an array o f foreign trade taxes, 
specifically on import taxes (27% of total fiscal revenues and 4.2% of GDP for 1990-1998). With 
time as the oil tax became a major source o f revenue (14.7% of total revenue for 1990-1998), 2 
budget accounts became dependent, as well, on international oil prices and exchange rate 
variations. Following a 1996 reform, the oil tax was made less vulnerable to changes in both 
these variables. The weight o f trade taxes remains a concern as the Dominican Republic registers, 
with few exceptions, the highest ratio o f trade taxes to total fiscal revenue o f Latin American and 
Caribbean countries.
In 1998, a tariff reform proposal was elaborated which plans to reduce present nominal 
tariff rates — so as to diminish effective rates of protection— , and to simplify the present tariff 
structure characterized by a wide tax rate dispersion. While the proposal would certainly yield a 
decrease in trade revenue taxes a fiscal reform project, also under current discussion, could 
compensate this revenue loss.
The aim of the paper is to examine the fiscal impact of trade liberalization and commodity 
price fluctuation for 1980-1998. The paper is divided into five sections. The first section 
describes, albeit briefly, the economic situation during the 1970’s that led to the first attempts at 
economic reform. This prelude is followed by an analysis o f macroeconomic performance for 
1982-1998, that distinguishes four periods corresponding to the initial attempts at monetary and 
fiscal stabilization (1982-1986), an interlude characterized by aggregate demand and public 
works expansion (1986-1990), a macroeconomic reform package (1991-1995), and the deepening 
o f economic reforms (1995-1998).
1. Introduction
The Dominican Republic has 7.8 million inhabitants (est. 1997) and a gross domestic product 
(GDP) per capita of 1 460 US dollars (Britannica, Book of the Year, 1998).
2 The oil tax is a tax levied on imported oil.
4The third section describes the evolution of the commercial regime and focuses on the 
tariff and fiscal reforms (1990-1992, 1997-1998). The fourth section decomposes the revenue 
side of the fiscal accounts between internal and external sources of revenue and examines the 
importance of trade tax revenues, import taxes and export taxes as percentages of total tax 
revenue and GDP. It also provides a comparison of trade taxes between the Dominican Republic 
and 19 other Latin American and Caribbean countries. The fifth section analyses the concept of 
budget sustainability and assesses whether tariff reform proposals would generate a fiscal 
revenue within a fiscal sustainability region. Finally, the sixth section examines the fiscal impact 
o f commodity price fluctuation. As export taxes are virtually nil, the focus is on the oil tax.
2. The 1970’s: the prelude to economic reform
During the 1970 s the economy o f the Dominican Republic followed a path o f import substitution 
whose goals consisted in weakening the link between GDP growth and traditional exports, 
loosening balance-of-payments constraints and promoting high employment levels. W ithin this 
strategy, the promotion of national and foreign investment became a national priority.3 The 
initial results were impressive. The economy registered on average a 12% rate of growth between 
1970 and 1973 with one digit inflation. Moreover, the budget accounts registered a surplus and 
the current account deficit was by most definitions manageable.
Eventually, as happened in other import substitution cases, the economy showed signs of 
deep disequilibria. The overall rate of growth dropped by 50% and the ratio o f industrial GDP to 
aggregate GDP began to decrease indicating the beginnings of a deindustrialization process. In 
addition, the market understood the official exchange rate to be overvalued and was prepared to 
pay a higher premium for every dollar bought (even though the real exchange rate was 
overvalued by 15%) reflecting devaluation worries over a merchandise trade deficit that had 
reached 7% of GDP on average between 1978 and 1981 (see table 1). 4 Following the fall in 
GDP growth the coefficient o f fiscal flexibility fell. 5
In accordance with the overall performance, economic sectors slowed their development. 
Agricultural production was hampered by a lack of incentives and industry showed signs of 
inefficient management due to exaggerated protection and state subsidies. Unilateral transfers to 
state owned firms increased from 186 million dollars during 1970-1973 to 589 million dollars for 
the period 1978-1981. This affected fiscal performance and was not balanced by an increase in
3 Ceara Hatton (1990) labels the development strategy followed during this time an import 
substitution strategy. Pons (1995) refers to a strategy based on promoting national investment and 
especially of attracting foreign investment. In any case, the import substitution model is not unique to this 
period of time. An early application is found for the period 1938-1961 during the dictatorship of Rafael 
Leonidas Trujillo (1930-1961).
4 The current account gap was also of the order of -6% or -7% of GDP as the service balance 
was in deficit and unilateral transfers (which started to be an important source of foreign exchange from 
1978 onwards) did not compensate both deficits. The service gap became positive starting in 1985.
5 The coefficient of fiscal flexibility measures changes in tax revenue brought about by 
changes in income maintaining constant a given tax structure. Here we measure tax flexibility in absolute 
rather than in relative terms.
5tax collection as the tax-GDP ratio, decreased by 4.7 percentage points between 1970-1973 and 
1978-1981 (see table 1).
During 1981 and 1982 a consensus emerged that achieving macroeconomic balance via 
market mechanisms rather than by targeting specific sector development through relative price 
distortions was a necessary step for long run growth.
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D O M IN IC A N  R E P U B L IC : S E L E C T E D  A V E R A G E  M A C R O E C O N O M IC  A N D  
F IS C A L  IN D IC A T O R S , 1 9 7 0 -1 9 8 1
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1 9 7 0 -1 9 7 3 11 .9  7 .8  1 1 .14  9 5 .0 8 1 .9 17 .9 3 9 .0 -2 .8
1 9 7 4 -1 9 7 7 5 .7  12.1 1 1 .19  84 .1 7 8 .4 19 .8 4 8 .5 -0 .2
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F isca l T a x -G D P  F isca l revenue  
rev en u e-G D P  v e lo c ity  
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C o effic ien t o f  f isc a l  
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1 9 7 0 -1 9 7 3 4 .2  1 17 .8 15.3 5 .5 1.2
1 9 7 4 -1 9 7 7 6 .5  -0 .1 17.3 14.1 6 .4 0 .6
1 9 7 8 -1 9 8 1 4 .5  -1 14.3 10 .6 7 .0 0 .7
S o u rce: E laborated  o n  the b a sis  o f  tab les 19 and 2 0  .
N ote: O  =  o ff ic ia l ex ch a n g e  rate; P  =  paralle l ex ch a n g e  rate; IC  =  in d ustria lization  co effic ien t; O C  =  o p en n ess
co effic ien t; R E R  =  real ex ch a n g e  rate. F isca l revenu e v e lo c ity  is  d e fin ed  as the ratio o f  n o m in a l G D P  to 
f isc a l revenu e. T he c o e ff ic ie n t  o f  f isc a l f lex ib ility  is  the rate o f  ch a n g e  o f  th is ratio.
Between 1980-1998, two stabilization attempts that followed this train o f thought were 
undertaken. The first one took place between 1982 and 1986 and failed due to a lack o f political 
consensus. The second attempt, based on monetary and fiscal restraint, initiated in 1990 and was 
followed by a fiscal and tariff reform. Both reforms sought to liberalize the economy. This 
attempt — so far successful—  has been followed by a deepening o f structural reforms. In between 
both attempts, the years 1986-1990 witnessed an experiment to spur growth via increases in 
aggregate demand coupled with restrictions on foreign exchange and trade flows that 
materialized in an increasing reliance in trade taxes to balance the budget. The following section
6describes in chronological order macroeconomic policies during 1980-1998 and their 
performance results. Emphasis is placed on the commercial regime adopted and on their tariff and 
fiscal policies.
3. M acroeconomic overview: 1980-1998
a) Initial attempts at monetary and fiscal stabilization (1982-1986)
In January 1983 prevailing economic imbalances led the authorities to sign an agreement 
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The agreement combined a restrictive monetary 
policy with active budget control through a freeze on expenditure and tax hikes. In addition the 
government imposed tight foreign exchange controls to fix an exchange rate parity. Betwen 1982 
ad the end o f 1983 M1 and M2 growth had decreased by from 13.1% and 16% to 6.7% and 9.1%, 
respectively, from the previous year and the annual rate o f inflation dropped from 60% 1982 to 
6.0% in 1983. The budget deficit as a percentage of GDP was half a percentage point lower in 
1983 than in 1982.
The 1983 programme finally fell prey to a contradiction that arose out o f rhetoric and 
practical politics. On the one hand the government vowed to accomplish the goals o f the 
programme; on the other government officials criticized the programme for its negative effects on 
employment and on poverty. 6
From a trade perspective the years 1983-1985 saw a decrease in the terms o f trade due to 
the fall in the unit price o f traditional export products. Despite the unfavourable external 
conditions, the authorities opted for a trade liberalization strategy reflected in a lower share of 
foreign trade taxes in GDP and of taxes in merchandise foreign trade (see table 2 ).
The end result o f the programme was a sharp drop in foreign capital flows and a surge in 
capital flight. Moreover, by January 1985 as the lack of consistency and credibility took hold 
over agent’s decision making process, the government allowed the currency to float against the 
dollar and later fixed a unified exchange rate for all financial transactions. Interest rates as well as 
prices were adjusted. The currency depreciated by 30% (see Graph 1). These measures ultimately 
increased the demand for dollars and according to some authors (i.e., Pons, 1995) pushed the 
economy into a de facto dollarization.
The worsening o f economic conditions led to a stand-by agreement with the IMF that was 
signed in April 1985. The agreement was designed to overhaul the financial system and stimulate 
the economy. The new IMF programme stimulated Dominican agriculture as previously fixed
Pons (1995, p. 415) refers to the end of the 1983 reform efforts in the following way: “This 
policy failed because the IMF was constantly being attacked by public officials while the government tried 
to execute IMF recommendations.. ..the government ended up discrediting its own policies...at the end of 
April 1984...government policy makers attempted to take advantage of the Holy Week vacation to raise 
prices of all essential products.” By 1984, the rate of inflation was 39%, M1 and M2 growth, 49% and 
30% respectively.
7prices were allowed to increase. The limitation of credit to the public sector helped to narrow the 
control on the money supply thereby limiting price expansion. The government was able to 
increase revenues through import and export duties. Foreign reserves were increased through 
IMF and by tourism and free trade zone activities. However, during 1985 the economy registered 
negative growth (-2.1%) discrediting the authorities efforts to stabilize the economy.
G raph 1
D O M IN IC A N  R E P U B L IC : O FF IC IA L  A N D  M A R K E T  
E X C H A N G E  R A T E S , 1 9 8 0 -1 9 8 7
Years
S o u rce: M artí G utiérrez (1 9 9 7 ).
T ab le  2
D O M IN IC A N  R E P U B L IC : F O R E IG N  T R A D E  IN D IC A T O R S , 1 9 7 0 -1 9 8 6
Y ears
F o re ig n  trade 
taxes as % o f  
G D P
E stim ate  fisc a l  
revenu e lo ss  
(M ill. U S D )
Share o f  taxes in  
m erchan d ise  
trade
E ffe c t iv e  tariff 
rate
T erm s o f  trade 
in d ex  
1 9 9 0 = 1 0 0
1 9 7 0 -1 9 8 1 6 .4% 14.6% 2 2 .6 % 18 2 .2
1 9 8 2 -1 9 8 5 2 .8% 143 7.0% 10.5% 16 3 .9
1 986 3 .9% 2 3 8 11.5% 14.9% 1 5 0 .83
Source: Martí Gutierrez (1997).
8During this period, the objective o f economic policy was to boost domestic activity by 
increasing aggregate demand through public spending (in particular urban public works) and 
monetary expansion. From 1987 on the share o f current expenditures in total fiscal expenditures 
dropped from 72% to 45% while capital expenditure increased its participation by 29% to 55% 
(see graph 2). In the same vein the ratio o f capital expenditure to GDP rose from 3.1% to 8.1%.
b) Aggregate demand and public works expansion (1986-1990)
G raph 2
D O M IN IC A N  R E P U B L IC : C U R R E N T  A N D  C A P IT A L  
E X P E N D IT U R E S  A S  % O F T O T A L  E X P E N D IT U R E
Years
S o u rce: M in istry  o f  fin a n ce  (1 9 9 5 ).
For its part the money supply measured by M1 and M2 grew by 36% and 32% 
respectively. Inflation and GDP growth averaged 39.5% and 5.1%. 7 This expansionary policy 
was accompanied by tight controls on foreign exchange transactions.
Exporters and later on, commercial banks as well as tourist operators were led through 
different means to surrender their foreign exchange earnings to the authorities at an undervalued 
exchange rate. Two examples o f this policy are provided by the adoption o f a multiple exchange 
rate system which transferred resources from the export sector to the industrial sector and by the 
monopoly o f dollar transactions by the authorities through the “Sistema de reintegración de 
divisas” (August, 1988). This implicit tax resulted in the invoicing o f earnings by exporters and 
other foreign exchange operators.
In the case of GDP we are excluding the year 1990. In 1990 GDP growth was -5.5%.
9In 1987 the country was forced into a balance-of-payments crisis as capital outflows 
coupled with an increasing current account deficit (99% increase between 1986 and 1987) led to 
reserve losses which amounted to 2.5% of GDP, in that year, and then increased to 4.3% and 
8.7% in 1989 and 1990 respectively.
The lack o f foreign reserves forced the government to delay payments on short term debt 
(mainly payments for oil, medicine, and food imports). Moreover, in May 1989, the government 
suspended servicing most o f its foreign debt and did not pay its debt to foreign banks. Finally, in 
the month o f September the monetary authorities announced the total suspension o f payments of 
its commercial bank debt reaching 800 million dollars. Suppliers cut off their credits as well as 
the delivery o f their goods to the Dominican Republic which included oil, food, medicines, raw 
materials. This in turn led to a fuel and energy scarcity.
Meanwhile despite foreign exchange controls the parallel exchange rate depreciated and 
eventually acted as a centre o f gravity o f the official exchange rate (see table 3). The devaluations 
o f the peso shot up inflation while the decrease in the supply o f production inputs and basic 
foodstuff led to a contraction in GDP growth.
T able  3
D O M IN IC A N  R E P U B L IC : D E P R E C IA T IO N  R A T E S  O F T H E  O FF IC IA L  A N D  P A R A L L E L
E X C H A N G E  R A T E S
Janu ary-D ecem ber, 1 9 8 7 -1 9 9 0
(P ercentage)
1987 1988 1989 1990
O ffic ia l ex ch a n g e  rate 57 26 0 81
P arallel ex ch a n g e  rate 58 27 30 58
N o te : E laborated  o n  the b a sis  o f  tab le 21 , A p p en d ix .
c) The beginnings of stabilization and structural reform (1990-1995)
In 1990 a stabilization package, termed the New Economic Programme (NEP, hereafter) 
was launched (see table 4). The main objective was to bring down the rate o f inflation through 
the curtailment o f government expenditure and a unified exchange rate regime. The reduction in 
the fiscal deficit was to be accomplished by the contraction o f subsidies to state owned 
enterprises and by increasing revenues by increasing trade taxes. The Central Bank engaged in a 
reduction o f the money supply by contracting credit, exerted a more pronounced control on the 
level of international reserves and started to repay the external debt. The first effects were 
contractionary. Investment and public expenditure fell by 20% and 10% respectively. GDP and 
GDP per capita decreased by 5.5% and 7.4%.
10
The NEP also included a series of structural reforms namely, the tariff, tax and financial 
reforms. The tariff reform (September, 1990) aimed at reducing tariff rates and their dispersion as 
well as the average effective rate o f protection. The tax reform (June, 1992) sought to increase 
tax collection and its efficiency. Both reforms are discussed in greater detail in section 5.
From 1991 to 1992 the economy began to show signs o f recovery. The GDP growth rate 
reached 8% in 1992. Inflation declined from 79.7% in 1990 to 5.2% in 1992 and the consolidated 
public sector deficit which had reached 5% of GDP in registered a 1.6% surplus. In short, overall 
macroeconomic conditions improved despite a deficit of 63 million dollars in the global balance 
of payments.
During 1993-1995, governmental authorities, led by favourable expectations o f the state 
of the economy, adopted once again expansionary policies. This resulted in a decrease in the 
central government’s budget surpluses registered following the implementation o f the 1990 
programme. On average for the period 1990-1992 the central government registered a +2.3% 
budget surplus in terms o f GDP which decreased to +0.1% for 1993-1995.
GDP growth decreased from 8.0 in 1992 to 4.3% in 1994 and inflation increased to 
14.3%. Finally in 1995 new stabilization policies were adopted and the authorities announced 
their commitment to fiscal and monetary discipline as a vehicle to ensure long term stable 
growth.
T able  4
D O M IN IC A N  R E P U B L IC  : M A IN  S T A B IL IZ A T IO N  M E A S U R E S  A D O P T E D  
B E T W E E N  1990  A N D  1992
F isca l p o licy P etro leu m  p rices w ere  d o u b led . T he o il  tax  or petro leum  d ifferentia l b eca m e  
an  im portant sou rce o f  f isc a l in co m e  2%  o f  G D P  o n  average b e tw e en  1991  
and 1995 and 14%  o f  a ll tax  rev en u es o n  average b e tw e en  1991 and 1995.
E lim in a tio n  o f  su b sid ies  to e lectr ic ity , sugar and  w h eat.
T em porary tax  o n  im ports in itia lly  set at 15%  b u t to  b e  lo w ered  to 4%  in  June 
1995 and that a ffec ted  40%  o f  all im ports.
T em porary increase in  ta r iff rates b y  1.3 and e lim in ated  b y  S eptem ber 1996.
Im p lem en tation  o f  a  fo r e ig n  currency transaction  o f  2 .5%  w h ic h  w a s  reduced  
to  1.5% .
M onetary p o licy Interest rate lib era lization . 
Internal cred it reduction .
E x ch a n g e  rate p o licy U n ific a tio n  o f  ex ch a n g e  rates and b eg in n in g s  o f  a  m a n aged  flo a tin g  ex ch a n g e  
rate reg im e.
Source: WTO (1996), IMF (1995).
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During this period the Dominican economy experienced high rates of growth (7% on 
average) with one digit inflation rates (7.3% on average). Growth has been led by the dynamism 
of non-tradable sectors (construction, tourism, communications) while inflation has been kept in 
check by the use of a nominal exchange rate anchor coupled with restrictive monetary policy 
measures.
Overall, fiscal policy succeeded in obtaining balanced budgets 8 and increasing the share 
o f taxes in GDP (13.8% in 1995 and 15% in 1998). Seen from the expenditure side, the focus of 
fiscal policy (especially since 1996) has been to reduce the share o f capital expenditures and to 
increase that of current expenditures. 9 The projected increase in current expenditure sought to 
respond to social objectives.
Yet, the bad financial state of public firms has generated a flow of unilateral government 
transfers that represented in 1998, 29% of all current expenditure and 22% total expenditure, 
constraining the government’s capacity to initiate social programmes. The current privatization 
process should help to cut expenses on this item and thus increase its discretionary spending 
capacity.
From the revenue side, fiscal performance is seen to depend on trade taxes as these 
accounted for more than a quarter of total revenue, highlighting thus the dependency of fiscal 
performance on these taxes. Despite manifest intentions to the contrary, reducing trade taxes may 
be far from being simple as other sources of revenue such as the value added tax revenues (18% 
and 19% of all tax revenues in 1995 and 1998) have barely increased in importance. This has 
forced the authorities, in some instances, to rely on excise taxes to achieve fiscal equilibrium.
More recently, the authorities have taken steps to reduce tariff rates and increase internal 
tax collection. In 1997, the government implemented a 0% tax rate on imported inputs and 
machinery. Also in 1997 and 1998 a tariff and a tax reform proposals were submitted to the 
legislative chamber for discussion. The tariff reform contemplates the reduction of tariff rates and 
their dispersion. The tax reform includes a proposal to increase the value added rate from 8% to 
12% (see section 5).
The performance of national exports has stagnated while free trade zone exports are 
increasingly growing in importance. 10 Due to high levels of consumption, and appreciated 
aexchange rate imports have sharply increased especially since 1996, contributing to highlight the 
role of tariffs as an important revenue source. The overall result has been a trade deficit that in 
1998 reached 16% of GDP. However, the current account deficit is 2.4% of GDP due to the 
growth of remittances and a positive service balance.
d) Reform deepening (1995-1998)
8 Refers to the Central Government’s budget following the cash flow methodology.
9 Current expenditure was to represent 60% of all government expenditure and capital 
expenditure 40%.
10 However the government has introduced a bill (Ley de Fomento a la Exportación), that is 
likely to provide incentives to the exports of traditional products such as for example tax drawbacks.
12
The capital/financial account has reduced its capital outflow and has become, as expected, 
an important source o f balance o f payments financing needs. Indeed, in 1995 net official capital 
outflows were estimated at 20 million dollars and private capital outflows were o f the order o f 40 
million dollars. While these figures represented an improvement over earlier years (in 1990 net 
official capital outflows were 300 million dollars and in 1994 private capital outflows were 150 
million dollars) the 1995 financial situation highlighted an important source o f balance of 
payments vulnerability. By 1998, total capital outflows amounted to 1 113 million dollars while 
inflows were 2 821 million dollars. Still, the level o f reserves is by most standards low (1 or 1.4 
months o f imports).
4. Commercial regime; tariff and fiscal reforms
a) The commercial regime
The Dominican Republic has partaken in different trade agreements and participated in 
regional blocs and more recently has become a member o f the multilateral trading system. 11
The country signed in 1983 together with 27 other Central American and Caribbean 
nations the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) which allows these countries exports to enter the 
United States market on a preferential basis. The exceptions to the rule apply among other 
products to textiles, canned tuna, leather, and plastic. 12 Similarly the country is part since 1989 
o f the Lomé Convention. Finally in 1998 the Dominican Republic signed free trade agreements 
with Central America and the Caribbean which contemplate negotiations on services and 
investment. 13
11 The Dominican Republic joined the WTO in March 1995.
12 The CBI had initially a duration of 12 years from its entry into force (January 1984). 
However, in 1990 it acquired permanent character.
13 Trade between the Dominican Republic and Central America is minor. Total Dominican 
exports to Central America amounted in 1997 to 41.5 million dollars (0.9% of total exports) while its 
imports were 162 million dollars (2% of total imports). The same is true of the commercial relations 
between the Dominican Republic and CARICOM (Dominican exports were 17 and million dollars in 
1996). See Centre for the Promotion of Exports (CEDOPEX) (1997; 1998).
13
Table 5
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: SELECTED FISCAL MEASURES, 1995-1998
Date Measure
January 1995 USD 10 tax per passenger on all airlines with scheduled flights from and to 
the Dominican Republic. A tax of USD 5 is established for charter airlines 
and air cargo lines will be subject to a tax of USD 0.03 per pound 
transported. The USD 0.03 tax was reduced to USD 0.02 in February.
June 1995 The 15% foreign exchange surcharge applied to 41% of imports was 
eliminated.
1996 Increase by 10% the tax charged to hotel, motel and aparthotel users.
1996 Increases in subsidies to state-owned firms (205 million Dominican pesos to 
The Dominican Corporation of Electricity; 110 million pesos to the State 
Sugar Council and 35 million pesos to the Autonomous University of Santo 
Domingo).
1996 Oil taxes will be used for the payment of the external debt.
1996 Increase of 30% in the pension earnings between 0 and 5 000 Dominican 
pesos and 10% those above 5 000 Dominican pesos.
December 1996 The oil tax differential becomes a fixed amount per type of product. For 
gasoline the oil differential is fixed at 12.48 pesos per gallon and will 
decrease to 12.17 pesos in 1997.
December 1996 Increase in internal oil prices.
1997 Application of inflation adjustment to the income tax.
1997 0% tariff rate applied to the import of inputs, equipment and machinery for 
the agricultural and textile sectors.
1997 Creation of the Dirección General de Impuestos Internos. This institution 
unified the Dirección General del Impuesto sobre la Renta and the Dirección 
General de Rentas Internas with the aim of centralizing in one institution the 
task of tax collection reducing operative costs and eliminating the duplication 
of functions.
March 1998 Increase in the exempted tax base of the tax income.
Source: IMF (1996), Central Bank of the Dominican Republic; ECLAC (1999).
At the same time the Dominican Republic has had a history o f maintaining restrictions to 
both imports and exports. For a long time it oriented its trade policy objectives around a gamut of 
trade policy instruments: tariffs, contingents, licenses, prohibitions, exemptions and concessions. 
These instruments were applied through different laws, decrees, resolutions, and administrative 
dispositions. According to the WTO (1996) prior to the 1990 tariff reform, there were 27 fiscal
14
laws that administered the regimes applied to imports and 140 taxes and duties. Imports were 
subject to three types o f fixed exchange rates. Tariff rates comprised: excise, ad valorem and 
composite rates.
W hile most imports were subject to these restrictions there were a few exceptions, namely 
the activities whose goal was to promote the tourism sector and free trade zones. The 
combination o f tariff and non-tariff barriers for most tradables and the exemptions granted to 
certain activities fostered a process o f development o f a dual economy with dynamic and 
stagnating sectors. This duality is manifest when comparing free trade zone exports to national 
exports (see table 6 and section 3.d above).
Import prohibitions which were especially prominent since 1979 included textiles, food 
and electronic products, textiles, shoes, cars, and luxury items. Import prohibitions were justified 
on the grounds o f encouraging national production and o f enabling the country to balance its 
external accounts. Between 1979 and 1986 there were eight decrees that prohibited among others 
imports o f textile products shoes, belts, and pastas. The 1990 reform did not explicitly suppress 
import prohibitions, however since the reform these have not been enforced.
Table 6











Zone exports as 
% of total 
exports
1980 960.4 117.1 10.8
1981 1 184.7 23.3 128.2 9.5 9.7
1982 756.9 -36.1 155.1 21 17
1983 781.5 3.2 181.2 16.8 18.8
1984 870.3 11.4 195.7 8.0 18.3
1985 734.9 -15.6 214.7 9.7 22.6
1986 726.7 -1.1 246.7 14.9 25.3
1987 708.5 -2.5 332.3 34.7 31.9
1988 898 26.7 519.9 56.5 36.7
1989 928.3 3.4 735.3 41.4 46.4
1990 744.1 -19.8 838.6 14.0 52.9
1991 659.6 -11.4 1 052.8 25.5 61.4
1992 564.5 -14.4 1 194.2 13.4 67.9
1993 504 -10.7 2 608.9 118.5 83.8
1994 626.2 24.2 2 716.1 4.1 81.2
1995 758 21.0 2 907.4 7.0 79.3
1996 835.7 10.3 3 107.3 6.9 78.8
1997 958.2 14.7 3 596.4 15.7 78.9
1998 942.3 -1.7 3 930.3 9.3 80.6
Source: Consejo Nacional de Zonas Francas (1998).
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M ost import quotas permits and licenses were eliminated at the beginning of 1990. 
According to the WTO (1996) the government denies the existence o f laws that allow for the 
application of quantitative restrictions to imports. There are nonetheless tariff contingents for 
some agricultural products (corn, milk, beans, onions, rice, chicken, sugar, garlic). In 1998 the 
government established quotas that are subject to preferential tariff rates for the imports of these 
agricultural products. 14 The quotas will be applied from 1999 to the year 2005 (see tables 7a-7d 
for the years 1999, 2000, 2002, 2005).
Table 7a
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: QUOTAS FOR AGRICULTURAL 
PRODUCTS AND TARIFF RATES THAT APPLY 
BEYOND THE QUOTA FOR 1999
Product Quota (t) Tariff rate beyond quota
Corn 858 200 60
Milk 33 600 83
Beans 14 400 95





Source: National Planning Office (ONAPLAN) (1999).
Note: The tariff rates applied to quotas oscillate between 5% and 40%.
14 In the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) agricultural 
products were consolidated at a tariff of 40%. The Dominican Republic tried for some time to change this 
consolidated tariff. Prior to 1998 the quotas for these products were still in the process of being 




DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: QUOTAS FOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS
AND TARIFF RATES THAT APPLY BEYOND THE QUOTA FOR 2000
Product Quota (t) Tariff rate beyond quota
Corn 897 000 57
Milk 35 000 79
Beans 15 000 94
Onion 3 125 97
Rice 15 755 111
Garlic 3 750 109
Chicken 9 000 130
Sugar 25 000 92
Source: National Planning Office (ONAPLAN) (1999).
Note: The tariff rates applied to quotas oscillate between 5% and 40%.
Table 7c
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: QUOTAS FOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS AND 
TARIFF RATES THAT APPLY BEYOND THE QUOTA FOR 2002
Product Quota (t) Tariff rate beyond quota
Corn 974 600 50
Milk 37 800 69
Beans 16 200 92
Onion 3 375 97
Rice 16 577 106
Garlic 4 050 105
Chicken 10 000 117
Sugar 27 000 89
Source: National Planning Office (ONAPLAN) (1999).
Note: The tariff rates applied to quotas oscillate between 5% and 40%.
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Table 7d
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: QUOTAS FOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS AND
TARIFF RATES THAT APPLY BEYOND THE QUOTA FOR 2005
Product Quota (t) Tariff rate beyond quota
Corn 1 091 000 40
Milk 42 000 56
Beans 18 000 89
Onion 3 750 97
Rice 17 810 99
Garlic 4 500 99
Chicken 11 500 99
Sugar 30 000 85
Source: National Planning Office (ONAPLAN) (1999).
Note: The tariff rates applied to quotas oscillate between 5% and 40%.
Import licenses for agricultural products are still in force. 15 In 1998 (decree 114-98) the 
government further eliminated non-tariff barriers to the imports of agricultural products in order 
to comply with WTO agreements. These non-tariff barriers were being implemented through 31 
decrees and 22 governmental resolutions and affected mainly, rice, meat and chicken imports.
Imports are also subject to non-tariff taxes. These are mainly the value added tax (with a 
8% tax base) and a selective tax on consumer products (STCP) (with a 5-80% tax base interval). 
The imported products that are subject to the STCP are basically: alcoholic beverages, tobacco 
products and luxury goods. The imported products that are value added tax exempt are books, 
petroleum and oil products, milk, and corn among others. An additional import tax established in 
1987 was eliminated in 1995.
Exports restrictions have experienced the same evolution as import ones. During the 
1980's there was an increasing anti-export bias. This was the result o f overvalued and multiple 
exchange rate regimes, export restrictions and excessive protection of certain national economic 
sectors. This was reflected in export performance which decreased from 735 million dollars to 
504 million dollars between 1985 and 1993 (see table 6). The legislation that has supported 
export promotion has lacked consistency. The promotion and industrial protection law sought to 
develop an industrial sector oriented towards the internal market and the creation of a
15 Depending on the circumstances this can lead to unwarranted price variations especially if 
accompanied by price manipulation. In 1998, the authorities overissued import permits for rice leading to 
an excess supply of rice which lowered its price. The government was forced to sustain its price by buying 
rice in order to avoid the negative effects of the fall in the price of rice on national producers. Import 
permits for a given product can lead to a bargaining process between the government and the producers 
affected by the import of that product.
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manufacturing sector oriented towards exports. The latter sector was designed to have its own 
export laws while the national sector was subject to a set o f restrictions, some o f which still exist 
today. The way the difference in treatment has affected both free trade zone and national export 
performance is reflected clearly in table 6.
Until recently export taxes were applied to basic commodity exports: bananas, bovine 
meat, cocoa, coffee, fish and sugar. Among these the most important products subject to taxes 
were coffee and cocoa. During the period 1985-1990 export taxes represented 2.0% of fiscal 
revenues.
In M arch 1990, the implementation o f the export taxes on those products was eliminated 
and in April 1992 the tax was suppressed. However there still exists a 1.5% commission on all 
foreign exchange rate transactions. The commission is payable to the central bank. Additionally 
traditional exporters must surrender their foreign exchange earnings to the Central Bank and 
obtain national currency at the official exchange rate. 16 Non-traditional exporters were also 
subject to this requirement but only up until 1994. This requirement can be seen as an implicit tax 
on export activities and a quasi fiscal source o f revenues. The larger the spread between official 
and parallel exchange rates the bigger is this implicit export tax (see table 8). 17
As can be seen from the above description of the commercial regime, most restrictions on 
imports and exports have been eliminated. However, the elimination o f import prohibitions, 
restrictions, tax exemptions coupled with an increase in non-tariff import taxes resulted in an 
increase in foreign trade and the import tax base.
During the 1990's the trade coefficient increased substantially (see table 19 in the 
appendix). Also national imports (i.e., imports that do not fall within free trade zones) have 
doubled their rate o f growth. During 1985-1990, these increased by 6.6%. For 1991-1998, the 
rate o f growth o f imports reached on average 13.8%. This increase has been brought about partly, 
by the import o f those goods that were subject to prohibition and important restrictions during the 
1970’ s and 1980’s. These represented in 1998, 23% of all national imports. This provides an idea 
o f the extent to which the import tax base would have been reduced in 1998 had these goods been 
subject to say prohibition.
16 These traditional products are coffee, sugar, cacao, tobacco, and mineral products other than
nickel.
17 Most minimum prices for export products were suppressed by 1995 save traditional exports. 
Until 1992, the governmental institution Center for the Promotion of Exports (CEDOPEX) was in charge 




DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: EXPORT TAX REVENUE OF TRADITIONAL PRODUCTS,
1985-1998
Year Official rate Parallel rate
Exports of traditional 
products 
(Mill. USD)
Implicit export tax as 
percentage of total fiscal 
income
1986 2.89 2.89 547.0 -
1987 3.51 3.84 542.0 7.0
1988 5.81 6.12 711.0 5.66
1989 6.35 6.97 747.0 8.72
1990 8.65 11.13 629.0 24.50
1991 12.58 13.06 556.0 2.33
1992 12.5 12.77 421.0 0.72
1993 12.5 12.67 363.0 0.34
1994 12.62 13.16 486.5 1.31
1995 12.87 13.6 591.3 1.92
1996 12.9 13.77 623.9 2.25
1997 14.02 14.27 667.7 0.55
1998 14.7 15.27 515.5 0.81
Source: Elaborated on the basis of ECLAC (1999) and the Central Bank of the Dominican 
Republic (1997-1998).
b) The 1990 tariff reform and the 1998 proposal
The 1990 tariff reform intended to rationalize and simplify the tariff structure as well as to 
make it more progressive. It established a new tariff structure with seven initial ad valorem tax 
rates comprised within the interval 5%-35%. This meant a decrease in the ceiling rate by 165 
percentage points. Prior to the 1990 reform the tariff rate structure was comprised within the 
interval 0%-200%.
The tariff rates were to be applied on the cif value o f the imported merchandise rather 
than on the fob value as was done prior to the reform. To avoid a sudden impact on given 
protection structures and ensure a soft landing, the authorities implemented a tariff surcharge set 
at 30% for 1991, 20% in 1992, and 10% in 1993. The import surcharge was finally suppressed in 
1994. Also a temporal tariff o f 15% was applied to all imports with the exception o f basic food 
products. This temporal tariff was eliminated by the second half o f 1995. Finally a tax on foreign 
exchange transactions o f 2.5% was implemented which was eventually reduced to 2% and later to
1.5% (see section 4 a above).
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In 1991 the authorities added an additional 0% tariff rate to the prevailing tariff schedule. 
The 0% rate was applied to basic imports. This increased the number of tariff rates from seven to 
eight. In 1993, the government increased the 0% tariff rate to 3%. The 3% tariff rate was 
expanded to cover agricultural inputs that were subject to tariff rates equal or greater than 5%. 
Finally, in 1997 the authorities increased the number o f tariff rates to nine as they decided to 
reinstate a 0% tariff rate on agricultural and textile inputs.
The tariff reform simplified somewhat the tariff structure. However, according to some 
the average tariff effective rate increased from 16.1% to 23.2% during 1990-1995. According to 
the WTO, however the average tariff rate was 17.5% in 1995 (with a standard deviation o f 10.2% 
and a coefficient o f variation of 57%). In terms o f sectors the tariff rates o f agriculture, mining 
and industry were 17.3%, 6.4% and 18.1% respectively. In 1997, our own calculations yield an 
average tariff rate o f 17.3%.
The tariff rates most commonly found in 1995 were 5%, 10%, 25% and 30% accounting 
for 10.4%, 28%, 13.3%, and 15.6% of all imports. In 1997 these tariff rates accounted 7.5%, 
24.1%, 9.5%, and 23.9% of all imports.
According to the WTO, the Dominican tariff structure that emerged out of the reform was 
progressive (i.e., a positive effective rate of protection). The tariff rates applied to manufactured 
products are higher than those applied to products which are semi-elaborated (i.e., 20.7% for 
finished products, 14% for semi-elaborated products and 15% for raw materials).
The effective rates o f protection o f the new tariff structure remained high. The median 
effective rate o f protection for the Dominican industry was estimated within an interval o f 133% 
to 188% (Fundación Economía y Desarrollo, 1996). Other sources estimated the median rate of 
protection to be at 123% for the Dominican industry in 1993 (World Bank, 1995).
Despite this tariff reform, as mentioned earlier, imports were still subject to several other 
taxes such as value added tax (8%) and excise taxes. The excise taxes applied to imports vary 
between 5% and 80%. Different excise tax rates were applied to imports and national products. In 
1995, the rates applicable to both national and imported products were unified to 20% and 25% 
for alcoholic beverages. Once these all trade taxes are taken into account the effective tariff rate 
may be much higher than that derived from the tariff schedule per  se.The favoured case to 
illustrate this point is that of automobiles (see table 8).
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Table 9
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: AUTOMOBILE TARIFF RATE
Description Value (US dollars) Percentage
Value (fob) 15 000
Freight 2 250 15
Insurance 300 2
Value (cif) 17 550
Import duty 5 265 30
Consular tax 200
Final value of import 23 015
External value added tax 1 841.3 8
Excise tax 13 809 60
Sale price 38 665.3
Effective tariff rate 91
Source: WTO (1996).
Finally, In November 1998, a new project for tariff reform (Proyecto de reforma 
arancelaria y  compensación fisca l) was submitted to congress. This project seeks to reduce 
gradually the tariff structure from a rank o f 0%-35% to five tariff rates within a rank o f 0%-20% 
in 1999 and in the year 2000 to four tariff rates with a rank o f 0%-15%. The reform will provide a 
higher tariff rates for finished products while at the same time result in reduction o f the median 
effective rate of protection. (see table 10 and graph 3). 18 The average tariff rate would be 6.3%.
c) The 1992 fiscal reform and the 1997 proposal
In 1992 the government implemented a fiscal reform whose basic aim was fiscal 
equilibrium. The reform tried to adopt simpler fiscal laws to increase the amount o f revenue and 
the efficiency o f tax collection. To this end the fiscal reform modified personal and corporate 
taxes, the value added and excise taxes on consumption.
18 It is important to note the similarity between the proposed tariff schedule and the tariff 
schedule that has currently been adopted by Central American countries and which mainly has four tariff 
rates (0%, 5%, 10% and 15%). 0% is applied to capital goods, 5% and 10% are applied to intermediate 
goods and inputs, and 15% to final consumption goods.
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Table 10
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: PRESENT AND PROSPECTIVE TARIFF SCHEDULES
Regarding personal and corporate tax laws, the reform increased the allotted amounts that 
are regarded as exempted. The reform established three tax rates that could be applied to personal 
income and one rate for corporate income. The new law established that public firms had to pay 
the same corporate taxes as private firms. Fiscal incentives were suppressed with a few 
exceptions (i.e., productive activities undertaken under the free trade zone regime).
The value added tax rate was increased from 6% to 8%. The application of this tax was 
extended to cover services. All exports as well as some national produced and imported goods are 
exempted. The excise tax on consumption which was a specific tax became an ad valorem tax. 
Fifty individual laws that contained more than a 100 tax rates were suppressed and were replaced 
by the new tax code. The new code contemplates rates that comprise 10% to 15% for national 
products and seven types that are comprised in the interval 5% to 80%. The reform also reduced 
the temporal surcharge on imports established in 1987 from 15% to 10%. This surcharge was 
eliminated in June 1995.
The 1997 tax reform proposal included an increase in the personal income tax base 
exemption and a fixed charge o f 10% on the income tax; an increase in the value added tax rate 
from 8% to 12% as well as an extension o f its base; an excise tax on petroleum products and an 
increase in the tax rate applied to alcoholic beverages (Pellerano, 1997).
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Source: National Planning Office (ONAPLAN) (1999).
5. External and internal sources of government finance
In order to provide an idea of the importance of trade and other tax revenue related to foreign 
trade the central government’s revenues were decomposed into internal and external sources for 
three periods: 1985-1990; 1990-1995; 1995-1998. The first period corresponds to the revenue 
structure prior to the reform. The third and fourth periods correspond to the reform period proper 
and that pertaining to the consolidation o f the reforms. The internal revenue sources comprise: 
income and property taxes; merchandise and service taxes. The external sources of revenue 
include, export taxes, import taxes, the foreign exchange commission and the external value 
added tax.
Table 11 highlights several important features of the revenue structure prior and following 
the tax and trade reform referred to above. Internal sources o f revenues as a percentage o f total 
tax revenues increased from 52.5% to 63%, a ten percentual point increase. This is basically the 
result o f the gain in importance o f the petroleum oil tax. As this tax reflects petroleum price 
behaviour and exchange rate variation, its revenue potential depends on exchange rate volatility 
and international oil price tendencies. This feature of the revenue accounts will be dealt more in 
detail in section 7.
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The external sources o f revenue have decreased by little more than four percentage points 
due basically to the elimination o f the foreign exchange commission as a source o f governmental 
revenue and o f export taxes. The revenue derived from the external value added increased in 
weight probably reflecting the increase in the value added tax rate from 6% to 8% (this fact is
also patent in the behaviour o f the internal value added tax).
However, import taxes remained, in terms o f percentage o f total revenue, at the same level 
as before on average (27% of all fiscal revenues). In addition, not taking into account the external 
value added tax, foreign trade taxes still account for more than 25% of total fiscal income.
Relative to GDP, import taxes represented 3.2% in 1985 and 4.3% in 1998. In the same
vein external sources o f revenue have increased from 4.2% in 1985 to 5.8% in 1998.
The importance o f import and in general foreign trade taxes can be attributed, in part, to 
foregone administrative costs o f implementing internal taxes versus trade taxes. According to 
Pellerano (1997), the administrative costs o f foreign trade taxes represent between 1 and 3 
percentage points o f fiscal revenue while the administrative costs o f implementing the value 
added tax and income taxes amount to a range between 5 and 10 percentage points o f fiscal 
income. In addition the high propensity to import (see section 4a) coupled with the recent high 
rates o f economic growth generates an increasing and predictable source o f fiscal revenue. 
Finally, the dependency on import taxes allows the authorities to use the official exchange rate as 
an instrument to increase government taxation.
Table 11
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: AVERAGE GOVERNMENT REVENUE AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL
GOVERNMENT REVENUE, 1980-1998
1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-1998
Internal sources of revenue 52.5 57.7 63.0
Income taxes 18.3 16.6 17.8
Property taxes 1.1 0.6 0.7
Merchandise and services 25.4 34.0 38.4
Internal value added tax 6.6 8.0 9.4
Petroleum differential 2.0 14.1 15.2
Other 18.5 11.0 13.7
Non-Tax income 7.7 6.5 6.1
External sources of revenue 41.1 36.9 36.3
Export taxes 2.0 0.0 0.0
Import taxes 26.7 27.1 27.0
Foreign exchange a/ 3.7 0.1
Value added tax 3.5 5.6 8.8
Other 1.4 0.4 0.4
Source: Elaborated on the basis of table 26, Appendix.
Note: The decomposition does not include capital income.
a/ Not available for 1985-1987.
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Table 12
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: GOVERNMENT REVENUE AS A PERCENT OF GDP. 
SELECTED YEARS, 1980-1998
1985 1990 1995 1998
Total tax revenues 11.4 11.8 13.7 15.0
Total Revenue 12.2 12.9 14.7 15.8
Internal sources of revenue 6.8 7.0 8.8 10.0
Income taxes 2.1 2.7 2.6 2.8
Property taxes 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
Merchandise and services 3.7 3.2 5.2 6.2
Internal value added tax 0.5 1.2 1.3 1.5
Petroleum differential ... 0.2 2.3 2.6
Other 3.3 1.8 1.6 2.1
Non-Tax income 0.7 1.0 1.0 0.8
External sources of revenue 4.2 4.5 5.3 5.8
Export taxes 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
Import taxes 3.2 2.6 4.0 4.3
Foreign exchange 1.4 0.1 0.0
Value added tax 0.5 0.4 1.3 1.4
Other 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
Source: Table 26 Appendix.
Note: The decomposition does not include capital income.
Indeed, devaluations, a frequent feature o f the Dominican economy, increase tariff import 
revenue income. This follows from our estimates o f the demand for imports which yield an 
elasticity with respect to relative price changes below unity (0.62; see appendix A.2 for results). 
This result, probably due to lack o f substitutes, indicates that any import price increase will result 
in higher import tariff revenue (table 13).
Table 13
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: EXCHANGE RATE DEVALUATIONS AND IMPORT
REVENUES, 1980-1998
1980 1985 1990 1995 1998
Selected National 1520 1286 1793 3164.2 4896.6
Exchange rate 1.26 3.12 8.65 12.87 14.70
National Imports in pesos 1915.2 4012.3 15509.45 40723.2 71980.0
Hypothetical tariff rate 10 10 10 10 10
Tax Import Revenue 191.5 401.2 1550.9 4072.3 7198
Source: Central Bank of the Dominican Republic.
Note: National imports comprise durable consumer goods, equipment, machinery and intermediate goods.
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The fiscal dependency o f the Dominican Republic on foreign trade taxes and more 
precisely on import taxes has generated debate and concern. Indeed not only does the Dominican 
Republic have one o f the highest trade taxes to total fiscal revenue ratios in Latin America (see 
table 14) but also as the Dominican Republic seeks to carry out a policy o f opening up trade and 
decreasing trade barriers and tariffs, the question remains of how to decrease trade tariffs without 
endangering fiscal stability.
Such an analysis can be carried out by first defining the concept o f fiscal sustainability 
and then estimating the revenue loss due to different tariff reduction schedules. The next section 
addresses both issues. 19
19 The concept of sustainability centres on the relation between internal debt and the primary 
(or operational) surplus (or deficit) and expresses that relation as a function of the rate of interest minus 
GDP growth. The higher the rate of growth of GDP for a given interest rate and internal debt-GDP ratio, 
the greater is the deficit-GDP ratio sustainability area. In the same way, the greater the difference between 
the rate of interest and GDP growth for a given internal debt-GDP ratio, the greater is the budget surplus 
required to remain in the sustainability area. Two other ways to analyse budget accounts and the impact of 
a given tariff structure on fiscal performance are the concept of “prudent” fiscal deficit and an analysis of 
optimal taxation. Akin to the concept of sustainability, the idea of “prudent” fiscal deficit places emphasis 
on macroeconomic magnitudes: “one way to decide whether a public deficit is ‘prudent’ is to determine 
whether financing it is consistent with other macroeconomic objectives ...growth of private investment, 
control of inflation.”(World Bank, 1988, p.58). One should add that the notion of “prudent” budget deficit 
also should involves an assessment of its magnitude or size. In other words, fiscal prudence should also 
depend on the level of the budget deficit relative to GDP. In the case of the Dominican Republic, as 
shown in table 21, in the appendix, the central government’s budget accounts have remained, by most 
accounts, manageable and in fact prudent. The fiscal balance as a percentage of GDP reached -1.2%, 1.2% 
and 0.5% for 1980-1990, 1991-1995, and 1996-1998 respectively. Lastly, the question of tariff optimality 
can be viewed from the angle of maximizing government revenue subject to a given constraint. One could 
envision total government revenues from tariffs as a function of two components. First, a given tax rate 
multiplied by a variable tax base (in this case the import base). This component would allow to examine, 
other things being equal, the fiscal effect of changing the import base via institutional arrangements for a 
given tax rate. The second component would involve a variable tax rate multiplied by an import demand 
function with given parameters. Total government revenue will be maximized at the point where the 
marginal gain from expanding the import base for a given tariff rate equals the revenue gain from 
increasing the tariff rate on a given import demand function.
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TOTAL TRADE TAX REVENUE, IMPORT TAX REVENUE, EXPORT TAX REVENUE AS A PERCENTAGE OF 
TOTAL FISCAL REVENUE FOR THREE REFERENCE YEARS BY COUNTRY AND TRADE BLOC
Table 14
Country/reference years
Reference year 1 Reference year 2 Reference year 3
TTT IMT EXT TTT IMT EXT TTT IMT EXT
Argentina 86/90/95 12.03 5.38 5.27 14.12 2.30 8.32 5.22 4.41 0.10
Bahamas 85/90/93 59.61 55.48 0.86 64.62 57.94 1.26 58.98 47.48 1.54
Bolivia 87/90/96 15.44 11.65 3.73 6.88 6.88 - 5.76 5.76 -
Brazil 85/90/93 2.33 1.50 0.90 1.52 1.49 0.03 1.50 1.50 -
Colombia 85/90/94 16.35 14.22 2.11 19.86 18.22 1.63 8.20 8.20 -
Costa Rica 86/90/95 21.06 13.01 7.95 22.95 15.53 6.86 14.89 11.55 2.60
Chile 87/90/96 10.30 10.30 - 11.60 9.30
Ecuador* 85/90/94 17.46 14.29 1.06 13.29 11.81 0.34 11.27 10.41 -
El Salvador* 87/90/96 26.13 9.62 16.48 21.77 14.10 7.62 12.33 12.22 -
Guatemala* 86/90/95 27.99 9.88 15.19 19.58 19.34 0.17 22.96 22.29 -
Grenada* 91/93/95 24.51 18.56 0.01 19.69 16.81 0.01 16.77 16.77 -
Mexico 86/90/95 6.02 5.62 0.40 6.24 6.18 0.07 3.99 3.96 0.02
Nicaragua 85/90/95 6.90 4.68 0.12 18.61 18.59 0.02 20.56 20.56 -
Panama 86/90/95 11.69 10.76 0.77 11.97 10.92 0.93 0.52
Paraguay 85/90/93 11.33 9.86 0.01 20.01 14.01 - 12.46 12.46 -
Peru 87/90/96 21.54 21.18 0.36 16.67 9.29 7.23 9.02 9.02 -
Trinidad & Tobago 93/94/95 8.83 4.59 7.32 7.32 5.58 5.58
Uruguay 87/90/96 11.90 9.11 0.25 9.43 7.70 0.54 3.48 3.20 0.03
Venezuela 87/90/96 12.72 12.72 5.70 6.90 6.90
Dominican Republic 30.2 26.4 2.1 32.1 20.4 0.1 27.7 26.8 0.4
85/90/95
Total Average 17.06 13.44 3.39 17.2 14.38 2.34 13.52 12.72 0.75
CARICOM
MERCOSUR 9.40 6.46 1.61 11.27 6.38 2.96 5.06 5.39 0.06
ANDEAN GROUP 16.70 14.81 1.81 12.48 11.55 3.07 8.23 8.06
CACM 20.52 9.30 9.94 20.73 16.89 3.67 17.68 16.65 2.60
Source: IMF (1998).
Note: TTT: Total Trade Tax; IMT: Import Tax; EXT: Export Tax; CARICOM: Caribbean Comunity; MERCOSUR: 
Southern Commont Market; CACM: Central American Common Market.
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A budget deficit is said to be unsustainable when it leads to uncontrolled increases in the public 
debt or when interest rates are perceived as being too much of a burden as they are imposed on 
taxpayers through excessive tax rates or unequal distribution o f the burden o f the debt (Sawyer,
1998). The concept o f fiscal sustainability can be examined using an equation that relates four 
variables: government expenditures, government revenues, rate of growth of real GDP, the real 
interest rate and the outstanding public debt. More specifically the equation says that the primary 
budget surplus as percentage of GDP equals the difference between the real interest rate and real 
GDP growth multiplied by the share of public debt to GDP (Pasinetti, 1998). Formally,
(1) S/Y= (r-g)D/Y
6. Fiscal sustainability and tariff reduction scenarios
Where,
S= primary budget surplus 
Y= nominal output 
r = real rate o f interest 
D= internal debt 
g= real growth rate of GDP
Equation (1) provides the boundary line between an unsustainable and a sustainable budget 
surplus or deficit. If, S/Y> (r-g)D/Y then the surplus or deficit is said to be sustainable. This is 
illustrated in graph below for a case of less developed country where real interest rates exceed in 




Notice that the formula considers only internal debt. It would thus at best provide a rough 
approximation to budget deficit sustainability in less developed countries since external debt 
often places an important constraint on fiscal accounts. Including external debt in equation (1) 
and expressing the surplus or deficit boundary line in national currency we obtain,
(2) S/Y= (ri-g) D i/Y  + ((re+E(e)-g)De/Y
where,
ri = internal real rate o f interest 
D i= internal debt 
re = foreign real rate o f interest 
D e = external debt
E(e) = expected exchange rate depreciation
This second case, more akin to that o f the Dominican Republic, includes external debt. 
Here, the possibilities for obtaining fiscal equilibrium become more complex as there are four 
variables determining fiscal equilibrium. In table 15 we carried out computations for 1985 
through 1998 o f estimated fiscal sustainability and compared these results to actual fiscal 
performance. From here it can be deduced whether the government has sufficient manoeuvre to 
reduce trade taxes without increasing other types o f taxes.
Table 15
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: STABILITY SURPLUS BOUNDARY WITH INTERNAL
AND EXTERNAL DEBT







1991 3.0 60.3 25.7 14.6 1.0 8.20 3.3 -4.9
1995 6.2 31.7 18.7 5.78 4.8 1.17 0.7 -0.47
1998 6.2 21.3 16.0 16.68 7.3 2.52 1.0 -1.52
Source: Elaborated on the basis of information provided by the Central Bank of the Dominican Republic 
(1991-1998), Pellerano (1998), ECLAC (1999).
As table 15 indicates, the actual fiscal result has been below the sustainability region. 
Also as the external debt and internal rate o f interest have decreased the stability surplus 
boundary has also declined substantially easing pressures to achieve a balance budget. However, 
the analysis clearly indicates that decreases in internal interest rates and/or in the ratio o f internal 
debt to GDP, or increases in the rate o f growth o f output would be simply insufficient to achieve 
fiscal equilibrium while at the same time trying to eliminate trade taxes (which amounted in 1998 
to 4.3% of GDP).
Using the concept o f fiscal sustainability, a simulation was performed using several tariff 
reduction proposals to examine the possible impact o f tariff reduction on fiscal accounts.
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Table 16 shows five different tariff proposals and their fiscal impact, other things being equal. 
These five tariff schedules correspond the actual tariff reform proposal (see section 4), a 10% flat 
tariff rate, a 5% flat tariff rate, and a first approximation and second Central American tariff 
reduction proposal. The first approximation Central American tariff reduction proposal 
corresponds to a 15%, 5% and 1% tariff rate on final consumption goods, intermediate inputs, 
and capital goods. The second approximation Central American tariff reduction proposal 
corresponds to a 15%, 5% and 0% tariff rate on final consumption goods, intermediate inputs, 
and capital goods. As can be seen from table 16 and as expected, other things being equal all 
tariff reduction schedules generate a budget performance that falls outside the stability surplus 
boundary. The difference between both the budget deficit resulting from the alternative tariff 
reductions and the stability surplus boundary correspond the amount as a % of GDP that would 
have to be generated in order to fall within the stability surplus boundary. The required surplus is 
smallest for the 10% flat tariff rate and is biggest for the actual proposed tariff schedule (i.e., 
tariff 1). In principle this difference could be overcome in all cases by cutting budget 
expenditures and or raising taxes. One possible scenario is to cut subsidies to public firms. Were 
this the case, only the 10% flat tariff rate schedule would allow the budget to fall within the 
stability surplus boundary region. This is shown by comparing column 3 and column 5 in 
table 16.
Table 16








Budget deficit/surplus as % GDP 
without public subsidies
Tariff 1 -2.39 2.52 4.91 0.92
Tariff 10% -0.24 2.52 2.76 3.08
Tariff 5% -1.74 2.52 4.26 1.59
CACM tariff 1 -0.68 2.52 3.20 2.6
CACM tariff 2 -0.74 2.52 3.26 2.6
Note: The calculations for the budget deficit for Tariff 1 proposals were carried out using the tariff code of the 
Dominican Republic provided the Customs Office (1997). The rest of the budget deficit calculations were 
undertaken using data form the Central Bank of the Dominican Republic.
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7. The fiscal impact of commodity price variations
As shown in the above analysis, especially by the fact that export taxes have been virtually 
eliminated, the behaviour o f the prices o f export primary products do not affect the fiscal 
accounts o f the Dominican Republic (see table 12). 20
However, this is not the case o f variations in imported oil prices. Indeed, the taxing o f oil 
derivatives provides, as mentioned earlier, is an important source o f revenue. On average this 
revenue source, known as the petroleum differential represented on average between 1985-1990, 
1990-1995 and 1995-1998, 2.0%, 14.1% and 15.2% of total tax revenue. In terms o f GDP, the 
petroleum differential represented 2.3 and 2.5% of GDP (see tables 11 and 12).
Throughout the 1980’s governmental authorities taxed the import o f oil products though 
excise taxes. Oil prices were determined according to a reference price which prior to 1990 was 
set at 40.5 dollars per barrel. Using an official exchange rate o f 1 Dominican peso to a dollar 
meant 40.5 Dominican pesos per gallon.
The pricing policy did not follow the dictates of international oil price behaviour or o f the 
evolution o f the exchange rate. In some instances as the world oil prices had a tendency to 
increase domestic gasoline prices were, in fact, decreased (1985 and 1987 are cases in point, see 
table 17). More to the point devaluations o f the exchange rate were not regularly accompanied by 
gasoline price hikes. Thus in dollar terms form 1985 to 1990 oil prices declined when in the 
international market they had a tendency to increase. As domestic oil prices were not linked to 
world prices or to the exchange rate through an automatic adjustment mechanism governmental 
revenues proceeding from this source have been volatile. In turn, this volatility was reflected in 
the fiscal accounts.
Table 17
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: OIL PRICES, EXCHANGE RATE AND OIL TAX REVENUES, 1984-1995
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1995
World Petroleum Prices a/ 29.40 28.14 15.10 19.16 15.96 19.60 24.45 18.32
Gasoline Dominican Pesos 2.95 3.95 3.19 3.00 3.60 6.00 10.67 20.00
Exchange rate 2.83 3.12 2.89 3.51 5.81 6.35 8.65 12.87
Gasoline in US dollars 1.04 1.27 1.10 0.85 0.62 0.95 1.23 1.55
Oil Tax revenue as % of 
GDP 3.4 4.9 2.9 0.6 -0.2 -0.9 2.0
Source: IMF (1995), ECLAC (1999). 
a/ Dollars per barrel.
20 Primary products can affect the quasi-fiscal balance of the Central Bank. Traditional 
exporters must surrender their foreign earnings to Central Bank authorities and receive Dominican pesos. 
Thus the fiscal accounts may be affected by commodity price fluctuations. This issue was addressed in 
section 4 a above.
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In august 1990, excise taxes were eliminated and the taxation o f oil derivatives followed a 
scheme known as the oil price differential. The oil price differential is obtained as the difference 
between a parity price o f imports and an ex-refinery price. The parity price is a fob price based on 
the MARAVEN formula. This formula takes as a reference price Platt’s Spot price o f the United 
States Gulf. In addition the parity price takes incorporates freight, insurance, foreign exchange 
rate commission and the nominal exchange rate. Given that the import parity price varies with 
nominal exchange rates and the world oil prices, the oil price differential became a fluctuating 
source o f revenue. In fact as oil prices increased and the exchange rate depreciated the total 
revenues derived from this tax decreased.
Table 18
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: OIL DIFFERENTIAL, EXCHANGE RATE AND OIL TAX
REVENUES, 1984-1995
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Oil differential as % of tax revenues 19.50 19.98 15.44 18.91 17.22
Oil differential revenue 2227.4 2192.5 2783 3634.5 3681
Exchange rate 12.58 12.5 12.5 12.62 12.87
World oil prices 21.46 20.56 18.46 17.10 18.32
Source: ECLAC (1999).
Thus, ultimately while the oil differential became an important source o f tax collection it 
was prone to the same weaknesses as the excise tax before the 1990 reform. The oil differential 
was still vulnerable to exchange rate and oil price variations. As shown in table 18 a stable 
exchange rate coupled with a decreasing tendency in the international price of oil contributed 
substantially to increase the tax revenue derived from this source.
In December 1996, the authorities increased oil prices which had remained constant since 
1991 ending an explicit subsidy to the private consumption o f gasoline. More importantly it 
decided to minimize the potential vulnerability o f the oil differential to exchange rate and 
international price fluctuation by fixing the differential oil price per gallon for each type of 
product. In other words, the oil differential became a constant proportion of oil prices fixed in 
Dominican pesos per gallon which is revised every year in the months of February, May, August 
and November. This fixed proportion allows the government to translate to consumer prices any 
variation in international oil prices or the nominal exchange rate. Thus if  international oil prices 
decrease in the oil sales price will also decrease. This allows to maintain, in principle, the taxing 
potential o f the oil differential. As shown in table 19, the average monthly volatility o f the oil tax 
differential as measured by its standard deviation is not higher than other taxes.
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Table 19








Income Tax 383.7 222.5 490.5 282.5 644.8 369.5
Tax on goods and 
services
751.3 74.73 1016.7 109.5 1439.5 92.14
Oil differential tax 195.9 43.25 392.07 77.45 467.6 74.99
Import tax 761.4 86.01 1000.2 130.5 863.3 97.17
External Value added tax 182.9 19.04 249.7 35.28 290.08 23.33
Source: See table 28 appendix.
8. Conclusion
During the 1980’s the Dominican Republic’s implemented macroeconomic reforms to no avail. 
In 1990, under IMF auspices, a stabilization package (i.e., the New Economic Programme) was 
launched. The programme which was centred on the control of inflation through monetary and 
fiscal restraint included a financial, tax and tariff reform. Following a GDP contraction in 1991 (­
6%), the package resulted in the resumption of growth accompanied by one digit inflation which 
has continued to the present day (with the exception of a brief expansionary interlude, 1993­
1995). During 1995-1998, the Dominican economy has maintained an average 7% rates of 
growth o f GDP and inflation.
The tariff and tax reforms saw light in September 1990 and June 1992 respectively. The 
tariff reform sought to simplify the existing tariff structure and reduce the tariff dispersion as well 
as the average effective rate of protection. Accordingly, the tariff interval was initially reduced 
from 0%-200% to 5%-35% and then to 0%-35%. The tariff rates which were seven in number at 
the beginning of the reform increased to nine by 1997. The average tariff rate was estimated at 
17.3% in 1997.
The tariff reform was also accompanied by the elimination of most import prohibitions, 
licenses and exemptions increasing thus the import tax base as well as the virtual elimination of 
export taxes. The elimination of export taxes coupled with the recent reforms regarding the oil 
tax differential have shielded the performance of budget accounts from commodity price 
volatility.
Nonetheless an implicit export tax to traditional exporters exists as these have to surrender 
their foreign exchange earnings to the Central Bank. The quasi-fiscal revenue potential o f this 
implicit tax depends on the difference between the official exchange rate and the market 
exchange rate.
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Still, external sources o f revenue are important as they represent 36% of total fiscal 
revenues and 6% of GDP as o f 1998. Import taxes represented during 1995-1998, more than a 
quarter o f total fiscal revenues and 4% of GDP. This dependence on trade taxes, which is one of 
the highest in Latin America and selected Caribbean countries, has become a source o f concern 
as the Dominican Republic is opening up to external competition. (The country is part o f several 
regional agreements and since March 1995 o f the WTO. In 1998, it signed free trade agreements 
with CARICOM and the Central American Common Market.) In short, how can the country 
carry out a outward looking economic policy while maintaining the present weight o f trade taxes 
in fiscal revenue?
In 1998, a tariff reform was elaborated seeking to reduce the tariff interval from the 
present 0%-35% to 0%-15%, diminishing effective rates o f protection and the average mean tariff 
rate. W hile the proposal is still under inspection by the legislative power, if  implemented it could 
decrease trade taxes substantially and endanger fiscal stability, especially since the present fiscal 
account surplus falls short o f the sustainability surplus boundary line by 1.5% of GDP.
A reduction in internal interest rates could diminish the sustainability surplus boundary 
line. Additionally, the fiscal reform — also in the legislative chamber—  which seeks to increase 
the value added tax rate from 8% to 12% coupled with substantial decrease in government 
subsidies (which the 1997 privatization law ultimately seeks to achieve) to state owned firms 
could generate earnings to compensate the fiscal gap and provide the necessary manoeuvre 
margin to distribute income. First approximation calculations indicated that even if  the tariff 
proposal is carried out and all government subsidies to state owned firms were eliminated, the 
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1. Selected macroeconomic and fiscal indicators; monthly exchange rates







IC Openness TGAP CAG
O P
1970 13.4 3.78 1 1.15 100 100 18.54 38 -5.0 -9.7
1971 10.9 4.27 1 1.14 99.2 60.8 18.37 37.9 -4.7 -8.5
1972 10.4 7.19 1 1.12 93.9 89.5 17.48 38.6 0.6 -2.7
1973 12.9 15.84 1 1.13 86.8 77.2 17.01 41.6 1.0 -4.7
1974 6.0 13.20 1 1.14 85.9 67.9 18.62 51.0 -1.4 -9.4
1975 5.2 14.31 1 1.18 84.9 89.5 20.90 54.6 4.0 -2.4
1976 6.7 8.07 1 1.20 84.5 82.8 20.62 44.9 -1.4 -7.3
1977 5.0 12.79 1 1.22 81.1 73.5 18.98 43.3 -1.8 -7.0
1978 2.1 7.09 1 1.25 83.4 68.6 18.58 40.6 -4.9 -8.3
1979 4.5 9.20 1 1.22 83.1 87.2 16.89 44.6 -6.0 -7.2
1980 8.0 16.81 1 83.4 74.7 15.31 46.2 -10.4 -12.5
1981 4.3 7.3 1 86.9 69.5 15.59 44.7 -4.5 -6.6
1982 1.7 60.1 1 84.4 61.6 18.40 35.8 -8.6 -7.8
1983 4.6 6.0 1 90.5 58.3 17.8 35.8 -8.6 -7.3
1984 1.3 38.6 1 138.8 67.9 17.3 51.9 -9.5 -4.0
1985 -2.1 30.9 3.12 3.10 110.9 66.8 16.8 40 -10.8 -2.1
1986 3.5 4.4 2.89 2.89 100.9 62.1 17.7 33.7 -10.2 -3.0
1987 10.1 22.7 3.51 3.84 113.1 76.5 18.1 39.5 -15.1 -6.2
1988 2.2 55.8 5.81 6.12 120.6 76.1 17.6 46.5 -13.4 -0.4
1989 4.4 34.6 6.35 6.97 106.9 75.7 17.7 47.5 -17.4 -5.4
1990 -5.5 79.9 8.65 11.13 140.7 80.5 17.9 46.6 -19.5 -5.2
1991 1.0 7.9 12.58 13.06 116.9 71.2 18.2 32.4 -14.5 -2.1
1992 8.0 5.2 12.5 12.77 112.9 68.9 18.9 31.0 -18.3 -8.0
1993 3.0 2.8 12.5 12.67 109.7 73.5 18.7 81.8 -15.0 -5.5
1994 4.3 14.3 12.62 13.16 107.9 18.4 79.9 -13.9 -2.7
1995 4.8 9.2 12.87 13.6 101.4 17.5 75.0 -11.7 -1.5
1996 7.3 4.0 12.9 13.77 100.8 17.0 73.4 -12.6 -1.6
1997 8.2 8.4 14.01 14.27 98.7 16.9 74.5 -13.2 -1.1
1998 7.3 7.8 14.7 15.27 102.6 16.6 79.4 -16.5 -2.4
Source: The Central Bank of the Dominican Republic (1997); Martí Gutiérrez (1997); ECLAC (1999).
Note: O = official exchange rate; P = parallel exchange rate; RER = real exchange rate index; IC = 
industrialization coefficient; OC = openness coefficient; TGAP = trade gap; CAG = current account 
gap. The openness coefficient includes from 1993 data on free trade zones. The real wage index is 
based on the monthly private sector real wage. The real exchange rate index was computed using the 




DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: SAVINGS GAP AND SELECTED FISCAL INDICATORS. 1970-1998
Years Savings Gap Fiscal Gap Tax-GDP ratio Fiscal revenue velocity
Coefficient of 
fiscal flexibility
1970 - 8.8 0.4 14.85 5.54 1.2
1971 -6.0 0.0 15.05 5.47 1.1
1972 -1.2 0.2 14.10 5.9 0.5
1973 -0.8 3.3 17.23 5.05 2.1
1974 -8.9 -0.5 14.10 5.87 0.3
1975 -8.8 -0.2 16.09 5.58 1.3
1976 -4.2 0.0 13.26 6.93 -1.19
1977 -4.0 0.2 12.76 7.16 0.73
1978 -0.8 -1.0 11.35 7.53 -0.04
1979 -2.3 -4.1 11.03 7.07 1.47
1980 -9.7 -2.7 10.30 6.36 1.60
1981 -5.0 -2.0 9.72 7.00 0.14
1982 -3.1 -2.7 8.10 7.99 -0.46
1983 -2.8 -2.3 8.15 7.86 1.16
1984 -0.3 -1.2 9.05 8.81 0.48
1985 -2.2 -1.3 9.7 8.22 1.27
1986 -2.8 0.7 11.3 7.07 2.39
1987 -2.4 -1.6 11.4 7.26 0.87
1988 -1.6 -0.9 11.8 6.48 1.37
1989 -1.0 0.1 12.5 6.14 1.24
1990 6.4 0.4 10.6 7.77 0.30
1991 1.2 3.3 11.8 7.17 1.22
1992 -1.5 3.6 13.8 6.41 1.82
1993 0.2 0.2 14.8 6.15 1.55
1994 0.9 -0.8 14.0 6.40 0.67
1995 -0.5 0.7 13.8 6.79 0.63
1996 -0.3 13.1 7.17 0.54
1997 0.7 14.7 6.37 1.86
1998 1.0 15.0 6.33 1.06
Source: Martí Gutiérrez (1997); Central Bank of the Dominican Republic (1997, 1998, 1999); ECLAC 
(1999).
Note: Fiscal revenue velocity refers to the ratio of nominal GDP to nominal fiscal revenue. The 
coefficient of fiscal flexibility refers to the ratio of the rate of change of nominal GDP to the rate of 
change of fiscal revenue.
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Table 22
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: OFFICIAL AND PARALLEL EXCHANGE RATES. MONTHLY DATA,
1987-1990
Months
1987 1988 1989 1990
O P O P O P O P
January 3.06 3.07 4.97 5.05 6.35 6.42 6.35 8.51
February 3.10 3.15 4.99 5.40 6.35 6.40 6.35 8.83
March 3.23 3.26 4.99 5.1 6.35 6.49 6.35 9.69
April 3.23 3.27 5.09 5.98 6.35 6.50 7.23 10.51
May 3.42 3.54 5.15 6.26 6.35 6.56 7.60 10.62
June 3.66 3.94 6.38 6.73 6.35 6.68 7.60 10.89
July 3.47 3.81 6.36 6.69 6.35 6.82 7.60 10.80
August 3.22 3.72 6.35 6.49 6.35 6.80 9.85 11.22
September 3.40 4.13 6.35 6.46 6.35 6.78 10.50 12.25
October 3.53 4.71 6.35 6.42 6.35 7.47 11.37 13.63
November 4.03 4.60 6.35 6.40 6.35 8.43 11.50 13.14
December 4.79 4.86 6.35 6.41 6.35 8.33 11.50 13.42
Average 3.51 3.84 5.81 6.12 6.35 6.97 8.65 11.13
Source: Central Bank of the Dominican Republic (1997).
2. The demand for imports, 1950-1992
The demand for imports was specified as a function o f real GDP and the relative price o f imports. 
Following León-Ledesma (1998) the relative price o f imports was proxied by the difference 
between the GDP and import price deflators. The time domain used for the econometric 
estimations was 1950-1992. Both cointegration and ordinary least squares (OLS) techniques were 
applied. The price elasticity o f imports in with both techniques yielded very similar results.
Table 23
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: OLS ESTIMATION RESULTS
Regressor Coefficient T-Statistic
Constant -1.31 -2.21
Real GDP 1.29 10.7
Relative Import Price 0.67 2.58
Diagnostics
AdjR2= 0.83 ARCH (1)=0.02 LM (1)=1.99 FF (1)=0.94
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Table 24
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: OLS ESTIMATION RESULTS
Regressor Coefficient T-Statistic
Constant -1.38 -2.21
Real GDP 1.27 10.7
Relative Import Price (-1) 0.61 2.4
Diagnostics
AdjR2= 0.83 ARCH (1)= 0.02 LM (1= 1.30) FF (1)= 0.0
Table 25
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: DICKEY FULLER UNIT ROOT TESTS AND COINTEGRATION RESULTS
Variable DF/ADF
Import volume -1.09
First difference of import volume -5.89*
Real GDP -1.27
First difference of real GDP -6.03*
Relative import price -0.14
First difference of relative import price -3.17*
Vector autoregression results
Tests Diagnostics/Lag order Lagrange Multiplier test for autocorrelation
AIK/Lag SC/Lag ALR/Lag Import Volume Real GDP Relative import
prices
67.8/1 58.1/1 36.7/1 0.11 0.14 1.15
Johansen Cointegration Results
Cointegration tests results Cointegrating vector
Ho H1 LRS 5%CV
R= 0 r= 1 38.5 22.0 LIMPV= -1.26 + 1.26 LRGD + 0.69 LRIMP
R= 1 r= 2 21.6 15.9
R= 2 r= 3 6.6 9.2
Source: ECLAC (1999), Central Bank of the Dominican Republic.
3. Governmental Revenue Structure, 1985-1998
Table 26
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: GOVERNMENTAL REVENUE STRUCTURE, 1985-1998 
(Millions of Dominican pesos)
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Total revenue 1 910.4 2 515.4 3 085.4 5 066.5 6 893.7 7 757.9 13 419.6 17 572.2 19 776.1 21 482.3 23 898.9 25 590.2 33 755.5 38 218.7
Internal sources of 
revenue 1 067.6 1 423.7 1 626.6 2 678.1 3 286.1 4 209.9 7 779.5 9 057.7 10 813.5 12 714.2 14 341.1 16 441.8 21 619.0 24 178.4
Income taxes 336.4 420 499.7 841.8 1 284.8 1 602.8 2 374.6 2 762.3 3 110.1 3 224.8 4 142.0 4 629.3 5 935.9 6 893.0
Property taxes 29 34.4 92.2 39.1 46.8 54.7 69.4 90.5 116.1 123.8 160.4 179.3 241.3 323.8
Merchandise and 
services 586.2 834.3 737.7 1 294.2 1 548.5 1 919.3 4 528.2 514.3 6 288.8 8 001.9 8 419.7 10 074.0 13 232.3 14 916.6
Internal value added tax 73.9 98.5 148.8 284.9 472.8 715.8 951.6 1 250.5 1 483.8 1 819.9 2 069.1 2 445.4 3 240.6 3 697.5
Petroleum differential 90.7 2 227.4 2 192.5 2 783.0 3 634.5 3 681.0 3 371.7 5 228.6 6 215.3
Others 512.3 735.8 588.9 1 009.3 1 075.7 1 112.8 1349.2 1700 2022 2 547.5 2 669.6 4 256.9 4 763.3 5 003.8
Non tax income 116 135 297 503 406 633.1 807.3 1 061.9 1 298.5 1 363.7 1 619.0 1 559.2 2 209.3 2 045.0
External sources of 
revenue 657.9 814.7 1 359.2 2 297.5 3 320.0 2743.8 4 451.1 7 604.7 8 512.6 7 869.2 8 648.8 9 248.4 12 137.8 14040.3
Export taxes 40.1 104.8 77.6 178.7 128.7 5.2 3.1 2.2 1.2 1.0 3.9 4.4 2.0 1.7
Import taxes 504.7 586.5 1 065.0 1470 2 045.5 1 586.3 2 969.6 5 333.2 6 038.8 5 777.9 6 417.4 6 942.0 9 006.9 10 402.5
Foreign exchange 407.7 825.8 856.5 909.6 1 053.5 656.3 284.7 87.4 0.0 0.0 0.0
Value added tax 81.7 89.7 168.8 176.4 172.2 253 516 1 153.4 1 717.8 1 704.6 2 037.2 2 194.9 2997 3 481.0
Others 31.4 33.7 47.8 64.7 147.8 42.8 52.8 62.4 98.5 101 102.9 107.1 131.9 155.1
Source: Central Bank of the Dominican Republic.
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE 1985-1998 
(Millions of Dominican Pesos)
Table 27
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Total expenditures 1 845 2 226 3 277 4 834 5 738 6 522 10 367 14 059 19 870 22 190 23 190 26 593 32 691 36 757
Current expenditures 1 400 1 609 1 471 2 128 2860 3 521 5 257 6 735 9 973 10 479 12 677 14 951 23 780 27 355
Salaries 613 696 677 965 1 191 1 580 2 065 2 745 3 472 4 081 5 343 6 109 9 892 11 211
Goods and services 248 297 358 353 542 976 1 428 1 654 1 523 1 379 1 325 1 500
Current transfers 415 578 446 748 790 1 015 1 526 1 615 2 193 1 925 2 938 4 685 7 837 8 045
Interests on the 
external debt
13 8 311 242 674 593 1 554 1 200 1 488 1 002 1 065 1 259
Other 372 335 87 110 210 331 451 806 1 326 1 619 1 385 1 776 3 661 5 340
Capital expenditure 443 617 1 806 2 706 2 706 3 001 5 110 7 324 9 897 11 711 10 513 11 642 8 911 9 402
Source: ECLAC (1999).
4. The oil tax differential
Table 28





















January 18.89 200 12.87 24.93 360 13.91 16.7 486.9 14.02
February 19.07 160 12.87 21.83 380 13.96 16.06 544.2 14.02
March 21.01 200 12.87 20.66 255 14.02 15.11 580.3 14.02
April 23.2 200 12.87 19.4 534.9 14.02 15.32 436.1 14.02
May 21.07 200 12.87 20.5 307.3 14.02 14.9 429 14.02
June 20.27 160 12.87 18.87 389.6 14.02 13.71 514.6 14.02
July 21.27 200 12.87 19.32 455.5 14.02 14.12 290.5 15.22
August 21.98 322.8 12.87 19.62 372.5 14.02 13.4 464.4 15.33
September 23.96 179.9 12.87 19.59 449.2 14.02 14.98 428.1 15.36
October 24.94 181.1 12.87 21.21 329.5 14.02 14.42 440.2 15.44
November 23.64 160.6 12.87 19.88 396.6 14.02 12.96 462 15.49
December 25.32 186.3 13.19 18.3 474.7 14.02 11.31 534.8 15.48
Annual average/total 22.05 2350.7 12.9 20.34 4704.8 14.01 14.42 5611.1 14.7
Source: Ministry of finance (1997, 1998).
Table 29



































January 308.5 917.1 200 665.4 158.1 380 1048.3 360 799.4 188.9 425.7 1562 486.9 680 249.8
February 190 748.9 160 689.7 167.9 235 977.2 380 790.3 198.5 334.2 1447.8 544.2 750.5 257.2
March 320.5 789.6 200 760.1 181.2 413.3 805.1 255 865 215.9 559.6 1522.2 580.3 846.3 292.1
April 589.4 719.1 200 737 175.7 811.9 1103 534.9 1035.1 248.8 1029.1 1417.5 436.1 843.1 303
May 272.6 700.2 200 783.5 192.8 305.6 884.5 307.3 1016 247.7 424 1378.5 429 867.7 294.1
June 843.8 685.8 160 638.4 154.9 1011.8 972 389.6 1007.8 260.2 1336.6 1422 514.6 848.8 280.3
July 223.1 823.9 200 752.2 184.2 310.2 1071.7 455.5 1095.7 274.3 383.5 1295.4 290.5 954.9 328.7
August 211.8 828.8 322.8 774 180.3 247.1 1014.2 372.5 1005 250.4 359.5 1474.1 464.4 934.4 301.3
September 647.2 689.8 179.9 693.7 172.7 833.2 1098.2 449.2 964.3 246 1121.4 1430.4 428.1 778.4 265.3
October 214.3 698.9 181.1 858.9 203.4 298.6 972.8 329.5 1079.5 276.5 380.7 1329.4 440.2 899.8 306
November 195 669.6 160.6 857.6 211.7 257.7 1022.2 396.6 1114.1 276.1 356.8 1383.5 462 913.1 290.3
December 588.3 744 186.3 926.4 212 781.7 1231.3 474.7 1231.2 313.6 1026.3 1611.7 534.8 1042.6 312.8
Total 4 604.5 9 015.17 2 350.7 9 136.9 2 194.9 5 886.1 12 200.5 4 704.8 12 003.4 2 996.9 7 737.4 17 274.5 5 611.1 10 359.6 3 480.9
Annual average 383.71 751.31 195.89 761.41 182.91 490.51 1016.71 392.07 1000.28 249.74 644.78 1439.54 467.59 863.30 290.08
Std. deviation 222.48 74.73 43.25 86.01 19.04 282.47 109.52 77.45 130.47 35.28 369.50 92.14 74.99 97.17 23.33
Source: Ministry of Finance (1997, 1998).
